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PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: ARE VOTERS REALLY SO NAIVE? 
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.* 
F OLLOWING the pioneering work of Kramer 
(1971), numerous studies have analyzed the 
relationships between the macroeconomic perfor- 
mance of political administrations and their popu- 
larity or vote-getting ability. Kramer's work 
showed that the aggregate congressional vote for 
an incumbent party can be explained rather well 
by variables indicating recent economic perfor- 
mance. Subsequent works have extended Kramer's 
research by explaining presidential vote or Gallup 
Poll popularity data with similar models.' 
On one point almost all of these studies agree:2 
votes and popularity can be explained well by 
models which suppose that voters judge policy- 
makers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of 
past macroeconomic outcomes. Most authors in- 
terpret their results as being supportive of the 
hypothesis of "rational" voters, since the evidence 
indicates that voting decisions are not based purely 
upon personalities, party affiliation, or chance. 
Kramer argued that if voters regard past macro- 
economic performance of an administration to be 
indicative of future performance, then a concern 
with past performance indicates a concern for 
future performance. Voters who simply extrapo- 
late from the past to predict the future are rather 
naive, however. A "sophisticated" voter, who has 
an understanding of the important intertemporal 
constraints embodied in the structure of the econ- 
omy, would be able to forecast future conse- 
quences of current policy choices more accurately 
than one who simply extrapolates. If votes and 
popularity are simply functions of past outcomes, 
then voters must either be ignorant of the basic 
structure of the economy, or unconcerned with the 
future. 
The supposition that voters are so naive might 
run counter to the intuition of most economists, 
who generally assume individual rationality as a 
central behavioral postulate. Nevertheless, the em- 
pirical results noted above have been accepted by 
many as evidence that voters do misperceive their 
own long-run interest. The implications of the 
naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policy- 
making are disturbing. Nordhaus (1975) has de- 
veloped a model which shows that voter naivete 
can encourage vote maximizing politicians to in- 
duce political business cycles and an inflationary 
bias. There is some, but not unanimous, empirical 
support for the existence of politically motivated 
business cycles, and casual empiricism also sug- 
gests that politicians themselves believe in the naive 
voter.3 
While studies show that empirical evidence is 
consistent with the notion that voters are con- 
cerned with the recent past, the results do not 
reject a "sophisticated" voter hypothesis. None of 
the aforementioned studies has tested a model 
consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis, 
i.e., a model in which voters understand what 
outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs, 
and are concerned with future as well as current 
and past economic performance. In this paper we 
develop such a model and estimate it using Gallup 
Poll data on presidential popularity. Results of 
this model are compared to results from a "naive" 
voter model similar to those employed in previous 
research. 
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' Fair (1978a), Bloom and Price (1975), Arcelus and Meltzer 
(1975), and Pollard (1981 a, 1981 b) have all estimated models to 
explain voting, while Frey and Schneider (1978) and Hibbs 
(I 982a, 1982b) have developed models to explain presidential 
popularity. 
2 An exception is provided by Arcelus and Meltzer (1975). 
3Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) have provided evidence 
of political business cycles for a number of Western democra- 
cies, and Frey and Schneider (1978) and Maloney and Smirlock 
(1981) have estimated policy "reaction" functions suggesting 
that the timing of elections affects policymaking. See Tufte for 
a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politi- 
cians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral 
outcomes. 
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MacRae (1977, 1981) provides the only past 
research which has attempted to assess whether the 
electorate is best characterized as naive or sophisti- 
cated. His procedure provides only an indirect 
test, however. MacRae assumes that political ad- 
ministrations choose policies which maximize a 
vote function. He then determines whether actual 
policy choices more closely resemble the solution 
to a vote maximization problem in which voters 
are assumed to be naive or one in which they are 
assumed to be sophisticated. MacRae found that 
the sophisticated voter hypothesis performed as 
well or better than the naive voter hypothesis in a 
variety of time periods. If political administrations 
do not actually choose policies which maximize a 
vote function, then it is not clear what implica- 
tions MacRae's results have regarding the question 
of voter sophistication. The fact that presidents 
fail to induce the political business cycles which 
would maximize votes under the naive voter hy- 
pothesis could mean that voters are not naive, or it 
could mean that the president does not implement 
those policies which would maximize votes. Mac- 
Rae's results are important in that they show that 
political business cycles may be of limited conse- 
quence, but a direct test may shed more light on 
the question of whether voters are sophisticated or 
naive. 
l. Measuring Economic Performance 
Conventional popularity models have assumed 
that voters look at past inflation rates, unemploy- 
ment rates, and perhaps growth of output in 
evaluating an administration's performance. Fair 
(1978b) has suggested that a more reasonable per- 
formance measure, one which would be embraced 
by sophisticated voters concerned with current and 
future welfare, would consider what combinations 
of unemployment and inflation were actually feasi- 
ble in various periods, and would consider the 
likely future consequences of policies currently in 
effect. Fair noted that "optimal" policies could be 
found by solving a series of complex control prob- 
lems. Given that "welfare" can be expressed as a 
specific function of current and future macroeco- 
nomic outcomes, and given a system of equations 
modelling the structure of the economy, one could 
determine welfare maximizing trajectories for 
policy instruments. Each quarter, with new infor- 
mation available, new optimal policy plans could 
be developed. Fair proposed a measure of eco- 
nomic performance for an administration based 
on the difference between the level of welfare 
which would result over an extended time period 
given the actual policy choices made by the admin- 
istration, and the level which would have resulted 
if optimal policies had been chosen. 
To test the sophisticated voter hypothesis we 
could compute a measure similar to that proposed 
by Fair and use it as an independent variable in an 
equation to explain presidential popularity. But 
doing so would require us to develop and estimate 
a macroeconometric model and to solve a large 
number of optimal control problems. Determining 
appropriate parameter values for the objective 
function characterizing preferences for output 
versus price stability would compound the compu- 
tational task. Although such an undertaking might 
be feasible if the model of the economy were quite 
simple, we have chosen to employ a less cumber- 
some procedure in developing our popularity 
model. It is convenient to begin by discussing the 
model of the economy underlying our analysis. 
We assume that the structure of the economy 
can be approximated by an accelerationist Phillips 
curve embodied in the following equations:4 
N 
Pt =,miPt -i + f (Zt) + et, f (Zt) > ? (1) 
i = 1 
N 
Lmi= 1 (2) 
where 
Zt =Qt/QNt -I 
Qt= the actual rate of output in period t 
QNt = the "6natural" rate of output in period t 
Pt= inflation in period t 
et= a random error term. 
This model implies that there exists a short-run 
tradeoff between the rate of inflation and output 
(hence unemployment), but no tradeoff in the long 
4 Although the model presented in equations (1) and (2) is 
usually derived under the assumption of "adaptive" inflation- 
ary expectations, it may also approximate an economy in which 
individuals have "rational" expectations, but one in which 
policy actions are not always fully anticipated or markets do 
not instantaneously adjust to equilibrium (see Fischer (1977)). 
We assume that policymakers can influence real economic 
variables, without ruling out the possibility of rational expecta- 
tions. 
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run. Essentially the equations assume that short- 
run Phillips curves are negatively sloped, but that 
the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.' If the in- 
cumbent administration adjusts monetary and fis- 
cal policies so that actual output, Q, is kept above 
its natural rate, QN (correspondingly, if unem- 
ployment is kept below its natural rate), then 
accelerating inflation will eventually result. If Q is 
kept below QN (correspondingly, if unemploy- 
ment is kept above its natural rate) the inflation 
rate will eventually decline. When Q is held equal 
to QN, any inflation rate may persist indefinitely. 
While conventional popularity functions assume 
that voters simply punish inflation and reward 
output or low unemployment, voters who under- 
stand the long- and short-run relationships noted 
above would evaluate policymakers differently. 
Inflation in a given period is largely determined by 
past expectations of inflation, which cannot easily 
be controlled by current policy choices. Expected 
inflation may be the result of mistakes made by 
past policymakers, and sophisticated voters will 
not punish the current administration for the mis- 
takes of predecessors. Sophisticated voters might 
also refrain from rewarding higher values of Q, 
since values of Q greater than QN eventually result 
in accelerating inflation. In short, sophisticated 
voters recognize that short-run policy choices are 
constrained to points on a short-run Phillips curve, 
and they will reward or punish according to 
whether the chosen point promotes movement to- 
ward desired long-run outcomes.6 
Faced with severe current inflation, sophisti- 
cated voters would prefer to see the government 
pursue contractionary policies (i.e., make Zt less 
than 1) in order to gradually move down the 
long-run Phillips curve. In general, the higher the 
current rate of inflation, the more severe the con- 
tractionary policy should be. Similarly, deflation 
should be countered with stimulative policies. As 
an approximation, we assume that the optimal 
value of the control variable Zf, denoted Z7, is 
determined according to the following linear 
feedback rule: 
Z,= d + d P , do 0O, d O < ? (3) 
where the slope parameter d, will be larger in 
absolute value the greater the aversion of voters to 
inflation relative to recession. The linear relation- 
ship specified in (3) should provide a reasonable 
approximation for the optimal Zt which could be 
computed as the solution to a control problem like 
those proposed by Fair (1978b) and MacRae 
(1977). In fact, for the particular model and ob- 
jective function employed by MacRae (1977), the 
optimal level of excess supply is simply a linear 
function of the inflation rate in the preceding 
period (equation (15), p. 247). 
An interesting special case arises when the inter- 
cept, do, is equal to zero. In this case, starting 
from zero inflation, voters find that the benefits of 
temporarily increasing output above its natural 
rate are exceeded by the welfare costs of the 
resulting permanent inflation. Voters would there- 
fore desire an inflation rate of zero and growth of 
Q to match QN in the long run. The arguments of 
Feldstein (1979) suggest that for a growing econ- 
omy this case is especially compelling,8 and it will 
receive special attention in the following empirical 
analysis. In the case where do exceeds zero, voters 
are willing to accept some permanent inflation in 
return for a temporary excess of Q over QN, and 
therefore would not wish to move to the horizontal 
5Recent estimates, including those of Gordon (1980) and 
MacRae (1981), suggest that the long-run Phillips curve is 
nearly vertical; however, our analysis does not crucially depend 
on this assumption. 
6 Because equation (1) is stochastic, we should also consider 
whether or not rational voters would reward favorable error 
terms. If error terms primarily represent exogenous shocks 
which are outside the policymaker's control, then there is no 
reason to reward or punish an incumbent politician for them. 
On the other hand, a president might be able to use policies 
besides aggregate demand management to improve the unem- 
ployment-inflation tradeoff, so voters might rationally attribute 
favorable error terms to the president's actions. We have de- 
cided not to include Phillips curve residuals as explanatory 
variables for popularity in the sophisticated voter model be- 
cause: (1) it is likely that error terms resulted largely from 
exogenous shocks during the time period studied, and (2) since 
we wish to be conservative in accepting the hypothesis of 
sophisticated voters, it is preferable to estimate a strong version 
of the model. Including Phillips curve residuals as an additional 
explanatory variable would blur some of the distinction be- 
tween the sophisticated voter model and the conventional naive 
voter model. 
7Gramlich (1979), in a study of optimal responses to price 
shocks, also chose to examine linear feedback rules as ap- 
proximate solutions to optimal control problems. 
8 Feldstein assumes that the welfare cost induced by perma- 
nent inflation will grow in proportion to the economy. If the 
growth rate of the economy exceeds the real social discount 
rate, which Feldstein argues is likely, then the present value of 
the welfare cost of an increase in permanent inflation above its 
target level (which we assume is zero) is infinite, and must 
exceed the benefits of the corresponding temporary increase in 
output. 
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intercept of the long-run Phillips curve. The case 
where do is less than zero is implausible, since it 
implies that, starting from a zero inflation posi- 
tion, voters would opt for recession and deflation. 
To measure economic performance, it is ap- 
propriate to judge policymakers on the basis of 
how far they deviate from the optimal policy Z,. 
In our empirical work, a performance measure 
appropriate for sophisticated voters is provided by 
St ( Z*)- = (Zt- do - d1P,1)2. (4) 
Higher values of St denote poorer performance. 
Clearly voters will not always reward increases in 
output; if inflation is a serious problem they re- 
ward contractionary policies, because they under- 
stand its beneficial long-run consequences. 
II. Specification of the Popularity Model 
We make use of a popularity function which is 
similar to that developed by Hibbs (1982a, 1982b). 
The general formulation of the popularity function 
is provided by (5): 
31 
POP,= E (aO + AX, k )D,t-gk-g 
k==O 
+bo + BVt + ut (5) 
where 
Xt= a vector of variables indicative of 
economic performance 
Vt= a vector of noneconomic variables 
affecting popularity 
Dt t - k 
-I = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
administration in office in period t 
was also in office in period t - k - 1, 
and equal to - 1 otherwise9 
A, B are vectors of parameters 
ao, b0, g are scalar parameters. 
Equation (5) says that popularity at time t is a 
function of economic performance in the 32 
quarters extending from the current quarter back- 
wards in time. Presumably the weighting parame- 
ter g is between 0 and 1, so that voters weight 
recent periods more heavily. Our estimates of g 
usually imply that the weight attached to a period 
32 quarters back in time is small, so the assump- 
tion of a finite 32 period "memory" is not very 
restrictive. The inclusion of the dummy variable 
implies that the current administration will be less 
popular if its performance is judged to be poor, 
but it will be more popular if the performance of 
previous administrations was poor.'0 "Honey- 
moon" effects for an incoming administration may 
therefore be either positive or negative, depending 
on how the preceding administration fared. 
Our estimated popularity functions will make 
use of the general formulation of (3) in all cases; 
differences in the models involve the selection of 
variables to be included in X,. In the naive voter 
model the inflation rate P and the output ratio 
Q/QN are included as performance measures, so 
the equation to be estimated is 
31 
POP, E (ao + alPt-k + a2Q-k/QQNt-k) 
k=O 
XDt, ,k-lgk + bo + BVt + ut. (6) 
The conventional hypotheses predict that higher 
output will be rewarded and higher inflation 
punished. 1 1 
In the sophisticated voter model Xt includes 
only the performance measure St defined in (4). 
Substituting (4) into (5), the sophisticated voter 
model can be written as 
POpt= E [ao + CO(Zt-k -do dlit-k-1)2] 
k =O 
XDt,t-k_lgk + bo + BVt + ut. (7) 
The parameters do and dl, which appear in the 
optimal feedback rule, can be estimated along with 
the other parameters appearing in the popularity 
function. 
III. Empirical Results 
In all equations, the dependent variable, POPt, 
is defined as the fraction of the Gallup Poll re- 
spondents who answered "yes" when asked if they 
9 Kennedy-Johnson are considered a single administration, as 
are Nixon-Ford. This is appropriate since neither succeeding 
president drastically altered the economic policies of his prede- 
cessor. 
" The specification implies that responsibility for the first 
quarter of an incoming administration's tenure is assigned to 
the preceding administration. Given the existence of lags in 
implementing policies and the fact that the outgoing president 
is in office for the first three weeks of the quarter, this is a 
reasonable assumption. 
1 We have also estimated equations in which Q/QN was 
replaced by (1) the ratio of unemployment to the natural rate 
of unemployment, (2) the percentage rate of growth of Q, and 
(3) the unemployment rate. Results from all of these equations 
are very similar, and would not alter any of our conclusions. 
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approved of the way the incumbent was handling 
his job as president. 2 We assume that poll respon- 
dents are representative of the voter population 
and that their responses are based upon the same 
criteria as voting decisions. The economic vari- 
ables consist of the quarterly inflation rate (P) 
computed from the GNP deflator, real GNP (Q), 
and estimates of the natural rate of output (QN) 
obtained from a mimeographed supplement to 
Gordon (1981). Non-economic variables in the 
vector VJ include dummy variables for each presi- 
dent, to reflect personal attributes which affect 
popularity. In addition, 1/TOF (where TOF is the 
number of periods the president has been in office) 
is included to account for honeymoon effects which 
are not interactive with performance. We have 
already noted that our specification permits 
honeymoon effects related to the performance of 
the previous administration, but it is possible that 
independent honeymoon effects occur. We also 
include variables to account for the effects of 
important political events. To proxy dissatisfac- 
tion with involvement in the Viet Nam War, we 
include KILLED, the number of servicemen killed 
in action during the quarter.'3 We also include a 
dummy variable for the Watergate period, WG, 
which equals one for 19731V through 197411 (i.e., 
from the firing of Archibald Cox until Nixon's 
resignation) and is otherwise equal to zero. 
Table 1 reports estimates of the popularity func- 
tions. We have estimated models corresponding to 
the "6naive" voter hypothesis and to our "sophisti- 
cated" voter hypothesis, and for each model we 
report estimates which respectively assume no 
serial correlation and first order serial correlation 
of the error terms. All equations are estimated for 
the 19571 to 19801V period.'4 The same variables 
appear in the two models; only the form of the 
equation differs. 
Columns (1) and (4) report nonlinear least 
squares estimates of the naive voter model. Under 
the assumption of no serial correlation, the esti- 
mates indicate that inflation has a significant effect 
in lowering popularity; however, the coefficient of 
the output variable has a surprising negative sign. 
When corrections are made for serial correlation, 
the signs remain the same for these two coefficients, 
but neither is significant. 
Columns (2) and (5) report estimates of the 
general version of the sophisticated voter model.'5 
These estimates provide little apparent support for 
our hypotheses, since both do and d, are incor- 
rectly signed. Collinearity problems provide a pos- 
sible explanation for the perverse results, however. 
In the sample period analyzed, deflation was a 
rarity. From the data alone, it may therefore be 
difficult to determine whether a preference for 
contractionary policies was motivated by a desire 
to fight inflation (indicated by a negative dl) or 
simply a desire for recession regardless of the 
inflation rate (indicated by a negative do). The 
estimates suggest the latter. 
We have previously noted, however, that a de- 
sire for recession when prices are stable is not 
sensible, so imposition of the constraint do = 0 is 
theoretically justified. Columns (3) and (6) report 
estimates of the restricted model, which provide 
much stronger support for the sophisticated voter 
hypothesis. Estimates of co (indicating how voters 
respond to suboptimal performance) and d, (the 
inflation aversion parameter) are negative, as hy- 
pothesized. Estimates of d, are significant at the 
0.05 level in both columns (3) and (6), while the 
estimate of co is significant at the 0.05 level in 
column (3) and falls just short of significance at 
the 0.10 level in column (6). R2s for the restricted 
equations differ little from those of their unre- 
stricted counterparts, and are higher than those 
obtained for the corresponding naive voter equa- 
tions, which have an equal number of parameters. 
12 Hibbs has noted that POP, is always between 0 and 100%, 
and he constrains predicted values of POP, to be in those 
bounds by using log(POP,/(l - POP,)) as the dependent vari- 
able in his model. Since POP, is always less than 80% and 
greater than 20% in our sample, imposing this constraint turns 
out to be of little importance. We have also estimated a number 
of equations using Hibbs' dependent variable and making 
corrections for heteroscedasticity, and all results were quite 
similar to those reported here. In the interest of simplicity, we 
report only those equations using POP, as the dependent 
variable. 
13Sources: Milstein (1974), U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census (1980). 
14 Popularity data are unavailable for three observations. Be- 
cause of these missing values, the procedure to correct for serial 
correlation is not strictly appropriate, and estimates should be 
regarded as suggestive. 
'5To obtain starting values for the nonlinear least squares 
algorithm, a grid of possible values for do, di, and g was 
searched. The grid revealed the presence of local, as well as 
global, minima for the sum of squared residuals. Interestingly, 
for the case where do is constrained to equal zero, parameter 
values at a local minimum provided almost as good a fit as the 
global minimum reported in the table, but indicated much 
milder inflation aversion. 
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TABLE 1.-ESTIMATED PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY FUNCTIONS 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses) 
Not Corrected for Serial Correlation Corrected for Serial Correlation 
Parameter/ Naive Sophisticated Sophisticated Naive Sophisticated Sophisticated 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
bo 0.6820 0.7366 0.6549 0.6999 0.7136 0.6279 
(19.4040)a (25.0275)a (16.7755)a (13.6420)a (16.6798)a (9.6362)a 
aO 0.1020 - 0.0127 -0.0025 0.1082 - 0.0052 -0.0002 
(1.5670) (- 2.2912) a (-0.6139) (1.0582) (1.6314) (-0.0606) 
CO - -18.2171 -2.4352 -10.2100 -2.8662 
-(3.5425)a (-1.9857) (- 1.6314) (-1.5922) 
do - -0.0140 - -0.0201 - 
- ( - ~~2.2516) a - -(-1.1789) - 
di - 0.0024 - 0.0106 0.0036 - 0.0095 
b - (2.1345)a (- 3.8972)a - (1.1763) (- 3.3196)a 
b 0.9268 0.8323 0.9255 0.9770 0.9207 0.9709 
(2.2210)a (5.0030)a (2.7886)a (0.9006) (1.9575)a (1.7037)a 
P - 0.0017 - -0.0012 - 
(-2.4408) a (- 1.1595) _ 
Q/QN -0.1063 - -- -0.1121 - 
(-1.6532)a - - (-1.1055) 
I/TOF 0.0858 - 0.0590 0.0948 0.0472 0.0015 0.0643 
(2.0645) a (-1.1313) (2.3213) a (1.0517) (0.0301) (1.4537) 
KILLED -0.0409 -0.0383 - 0.0360 - 0.0172 -0.0192 -0.0190 
( 43435)a (4. 3699)a (-3.9215)a (1.4061) (-1.6762)a (-1.6979)a 
WG -0.1661 -0.2088 -0.1446 -0.0964 -0.1234 -0.0928 
(-3.6881)a (-5.3877)a (-3.3332) (a 1.8016) (a 2.5063) (a 1.8749)a 
KENNEDY -0.0289 -0.0279 -0.0045 -0.1044 -0.0743 -0.0137 
(-0.6987) (- 1.0077) (-0.1037) (- 1.3761) (- 1.3237) (-0.1556) 
JOHNSON 0.0125 0.0797 0.0186 -0.0067 0.0368 0.0416 
(0.4528)a (2.2933)a (0.7441) (-0.1160) (0.7557) (0.7061) 
NIXON - 0.1160 - 0.1429 -0.1114 -0.2216 - 0.2288 -0.1637 
(- 2.8772)a (- 4.7842)a (_3.1459)a (_3.0495)a (3.7 500)a (-2.5841)a 
FORD - 0.0663 0.0209 -0.0516 -0.0260 - 0.0016 0.0230 
(- 1.5098) (0.4536) (- 1.1539) (-0.3348) (-0.0266) (0.2860) 
CARTER -0.2353 -0.2723 -0.1994 -0.3226 -0.3419 - 0.2298 
( 5.5936)a (-8.4383)a (-4.8132)a (-4.7140)a (-5.5490)a (-3.0505)a 
R2 0.821 0.845 0.829 0.628 0.679 0.653 
D.W. 1.18 1.36 1.21 - - - 
aSignificant at the 0. IO level. 
b Reported t-statistic is for the test of Ho: g = I 
Clearly these results show that the sophisticated 
voter hypothesis is consistent with the data, and 
performs as well or better than the naive voter 
hypothesis. 
With dI = -0.0 106, the estimate obtained from 
column (3), the model implies that voters would 
like to see actual output be 10.6% below the natu- 
ral rate of output when the inflation rate is 10%. 
Translating via Okun's Law, this would imply that 
voters desire an unemployment rate about 3.5% 
above its natural rate. Although this implies that 
voters desire a severe recession when inflation is 
high, it cannot be considered a completely unrea- 
sonable estimate. 6 The estimate of d1 from col- 
umn (6) implies slightly weaker aversion to infla- 
tion. 
The estimate of co from column (3) indicates 
that if the actual current Q/QN were to deviate 
from the voters' perceived optimal Q/QN by 0.05, 
then the resulting popularity rating would be 0.61 
percentage points lower than that which would 
16 Some officials in the Reagan administration seemed willing 
to tolerate unemployment of more than 10% (probably 3% to 
4% above the natural rate) to fight inflation in 1 982. If adminis- 
tration economic experts are willing to accept such a tradeoff, 
rational voters might very well do so also. 
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have resulted had optimal policies been chosen. Of 
course if the administration consistently deviates 
from the optimum by that amount, the cumulative 
popularity consequences are much more severe. 
After 8 years, the cumulative effect is a popularity 
loss of about 7.3 percentage points. Somewhat 
larger effects are implied by estimates in column 
(6). 
Conclusions regarding the noneconomic vari- 
ables are similar for all six equations. The coef- 
ficients of the Watergate and Viet Nam War 
variables are negative, as anticipated, and gener- 
ally significant. The presidential dummies are also 
often significant. There is some evidence of 
honeymoon effects unrelated to past economic per- 
formance, since the coefficient of 1/TOF is some- 
times significantly positive. Estimates of the 
weighting parameter g range from 0.83 to 0.98, 
generally a bit higher than the estimates provided 
by Hibbs (1982a). 
IV. Evaluating the Performance of Different 
Administrations 
Using estimates of do and d, and historical data 
for Q and QN, we can construct predicted values 
of S,, denoted S,, by using the definition provided 
by equation (4). By comparing mean values of S, 
over different administrations, we can compare the 
economic performance of those administrations as 
judged by sophisticated voters. Our performance 
measure is similar to that proposed by Fair (1978b). 
Like that measure, ouis does not punish an admin- 
istration for inflation caused by predecessors, and 
it incorporates a concern for future outcomes. 
Unlike Fair's measure, preferences regarding infla- 
tion and output are based on empirical evidence 
(i.e., the estimate of d,) in our measure. Fair's 
performance measures were constructed for two 
alternative but arbitrary parameter choices which 
indicated relative preferences for output and infla- 
tion, and he made use of a large and realistic 
model of the economy to provide the constraints 
on feasible outcomes. 
Table 2 provides mean values of S, calculated 
using the estimate of d, obtained from column (3) 
of table 1 and setting do equal to zero."7 The table 
TABLE 2.-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
Rank based Rank by 
Administration Mean S, on Mean S, Fair (1 978b) 
Eisenhower I 17.18 x 10-4 3 2 
Eisenhower II 7.38 x 10-4 2 5 
Kennedy-Johnson 4.31x 10-4 1 4 
Johnson 59.39 x 10-4 7 3 
Nixon 38.79 x 10-4 4 1 
Nixon-Ford 43.49 x 10-4 5 Not ranked 
Carter 52.47 x 10 - 4 6 Not ranked 
also provides rankings of the administrations, and 
compares these rankings with those provided by 
Fair (1978b, p. 306). Since our estimates indicate a 
rather strong aversion to inflation, we provide 
Fair's rankings based on a stronger aversion to 
inflation. 
The results show that Kennedy-Johnson and 
Eisenhower II rank highest in economic perfor- 
mance. In these administrations, mild inflation 
was countered with mild slackness in the economy. 
The worst performance was provided by the John- 
son administration. The macroeconomic stimulus 
resulting from Viet Nam War spending is often 
pointed to as a source of subsequent inflation, and 
this is reflected in our rankings. Carter also gets a 
low rating, primarily for failing to impose a suffi- 
ciently contractionary stance in the face of rapid 
inflation. Fair's rankings differ substantially from 
ours. This may result from a stronger aversion to 
inflation implicit in our measure, or relatively small 
long- and short-run inflationary costs associated 
with high levels of output in Fair's model of the 
economy. 
V. Conclusions 
Our results show that data on Presidential popu- 
larity are consistent with the hypothesis that voters 
are concerned with the future consequences of 
current economic policy choices and are aware of 
the nature of constraints imposed by economic 
reality. Our sophisticated voter model performs as 
well or better than a conventional popularity model 
which assumes that voters are myopic or have 
limited knowledge of the workings of the econ- 
omy. Our conclusions are therefore similar to those 
of MacRae (1977, 1981), who found a limited 
potential for politically motivated business cycles. 
17The results were similar when we used estimates obtained 
from equation (6). 
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Of course, the results do not prove that the 
electorate is "sophisticated." We have not ex- 
amined all possible specifications for popularity 
functions, and we have examined just one set of 
data. We have not attempted to account for chang- 
ing voter preferences over time, for changes in the 
structure of the economy, or for differing prefer- 
ences for various subgroups in the population. In 
future work we plan to address some of these 
problems and investigate other sources of data 
which researchers have employed in studying the 
response of the populace to macroeconomic per- 
formance. In the meantime, however, we should be 
wary of accepting the naive voter hypothesis which 
much previous research professes to support. 
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